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Quantifying the Subjective: Psychophysics and
the Geometry of Color
Alistair M. C. Isaac
October 26, 2011
How can we develop a scientific theory of experience? There seems to be an
insurmountable problem here. Experience is inherently subjective—only I have
access to my experience—yet science demands objectivity, in the sense that any
results must be accessible and repeatable by others. The “what it’s like” of
a conscious experience cannot be detached from the subject who experiences
it, so how can it be made accessible and repeatable to a scientific community?
How can we have an objective theory of something which appears inherently
subjective?
The essential insight for answering this question is that by intra-subjective
comparisons of experiences, we can produce evidence for an objective theory of
the relationship between them, if not of their intrinsic natures. In practice, this
general approach has been implemented since at least the ancient Greeks, but
its refinement into a systematic method is usually dated to the pioneering work
of Ernst Weber and Gustav Fechner in developing the field of psychophysics
(Section 1). However, the procedures they proposed assume that sensations can
be linearly ordered. The rest of this paper will investigate the development
of psychophysical methods for a domain which cannot be characterized by a
simple linear order, the experience of color. In Section 2 we will explore some
of the difficulties for ordering colors and how these inspired a new geometrical
paradigm at the hands of Bernhard Riemann. Riemann’s work explored the idea
that the structure of subjective experience cannot be determined a priori, but
must be measured. The first to actually make such measurements, and produce
a metrically significant model of color space, was Helmholtz (Section 3).
Section 4 examines the one serious attempt to apply Weber’s method directly
to color experience, the difficulties encountered, and the alternative techniques
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which emerged in its wake. Special attention will be paid to the status of
evidence for similarities in the experience of color across individuals. Section 5
assesses the evidence for objective claims about the experience of color: what
can we say with certainty about the color experience of others? Is there any
sense in which I can break through the apparent subjectivity and assert that
your experience of color and mine are the same?
1 How to Study Subjective Experience
How can I measure qualitative experience, something which is inherently subjec-
tive? Although the “what it’s like” of experience cannot be directly investigated
experimentally, comparisons between a subject’s experiences can be investi-
gated through repeatable experiments. In particular, we can present subjects
with stimuli and ask them to report upon how they differ. For example, I may
not be able to characterize scientifically what it’s like for you to experience the
brightness of a light, but I can present you with two lights and ask which one
appears brighter to you.
Although such comparisons have long been made in practice, the codification
of this insight into a well defined experimental method can be dated to Gustav
Fechner (1801–1887) and his Elements of Psychophysics. Fechner recognized
that, in the absence of a means to directly measure sensation, one could let easily
measured properties of the stimuli stand as a proxy for degrees of sensation: “we
measure here not the sensation itself, but only the stimuli or stimulus differences
that produce equal sensations or equal differences between sensations” (Fechner,
1860a, p. 46). This procedure assumes that intensity of sensation is a function
of stimulus strength. By varying the independent variable (stimulus strength),
we can learn about the relative value of the dependent variable (intensity of
sensation):
Insofar as sensitivity is a variable, we should not seek for a constant
as its measure. We may, however, look for (1) its limits and (2) its
mean values; we may also investigate (3) how its variations depend
on conditions; finally we may seek (4) lawful relations that remain
constant during variation; the last are the most important. (Fechner,
1860a, p. 45)
Fechner collected and elucidated several distinct experimental methods for in-
vestigating these questions. He called this field “psychophysics” since it inves-
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tigates the systematic relationship between physical stimuli and psychological
experience.
The most fundamental concept for understanding the methods of early psy-
chophysics is the just noticeable difference. Fechner’s discussion of the just
noticeable difference and its role in experimentation is heavily influenced by the
work of his mentor and collaborator, Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878). Weber
asked subjects to compare the intensities of sensations caused by two stimuli.
By holding one stimulus fixed and systematically varying some parameter (e.g.
weight, temperature, color) of the second stimulus, he could discover the small-
est amount of physical (and therefore easily measurable) difference between
stimuli required to produce a noticeable difference between sensations. Other
methods discussed by Fechner, such as the method of right and wrong cases and
the method of average error, share with the method of just noticeable differences
two methodological constraints: 1. a single physical parameter is varied, and 2.
subjects make comparisons between two stimuli.
What kind of conclusions can be drawn from psychophysical experiments?
Weber discovered through experimentation that our experience of the weight of
an object is actually calculated from at least three distinct inputs: pressure,
muscle activity, and temperature. As a consequence, Weber argued that the
supposed “sense of touch” is really a collection of distinct sensory faculties,
each of which contributes to the experience of an object’s heaviness. Although
we usually do not attend to these different aspects of our experience of weight,
Weber was able to isolate each of them by controlling for the effects of the
others. Let’s look at two examples in order to see how this works (see Weber,
1846, for details).
Experiment one. Weber was interested in the question of whether or not in-
formation from muscle activity (as when, say, one hefts an object) contributed
to judgments of weight. In order to experimentally test this question, he devised
a single set of stimuli and two conditions. The stimuli were just a set of small
boxes, all identical in appearance and size, yet differing slightly in weight. In
the first condition, subjects were asked to lay their forearms on a table (this was
to prevent muscle activity from contributing to their judgments) and boxes were
placed successively in their hands until the subject could detect the difference
in weight. In this condition, only the sensation of pressure contributes to the
experience of heaviness. Weber was able to measure the size of a difference in
the weight of stimuli necessary to produce a just noticeable difference in the
subject’s perception of heaviness. In the second condition, Weber again offered
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the subject boxes differing in weight until the subject was able to notice the
difference. This time, however, the subject was standing up and able to heft
the boxes in each hand before judging. Weber again measured the difference
in stimulus weight required to produce a just noticeable difference in the sub-
ject’s perception of heaviness. What Weber discovered was that the difference
in weights required to produce a perceptual difference in heaviness was much
smaller in the second condition, when subjects were allowed to use their muscles,
than in the first condition. He concluded that information from muscle activity
indeed contributes to judgments of weight.
Experiment two. Weber wondered whether sensibilities other than pressure
and muscle activity contribute to judgments of weight. Weber tested whether
the sensation of temperature contributes to such judgments by placing coins of
different temperatures on a subject’s forehead (i.e. out of sight of the subject).
Weber discovered that cold coins were judged to be much heavier than warm
ones. For example, if a single silver Thaler cooled to near freezing and a stacked
pair of silver Thaler at room temperature are placed on a subject’s head in alter-
nation until the subject can form a judgment about their respective heaviness,
the subject will judge them to be equally heavy, or even that the single cold
Thaler is heavier than the two stacked warm Thaler. Weber concluded that
sensations of temperature indeed contribute to judgments about weight.
These two experiments support qualitative conclusions about how the sub-
jective experience of heaviness is calculated by our perceptual system. In order
to develop a quantitative theory of subjective experience, we merely need to per-
form Weber’s experiments with a number of different comparison weights. This
will reveal any systematic relationship between changes in weight and changes
in the experience of heaviness. If such exists, it would constitute an instance of
Fechner’s “lawful relations that remain constant during variation.”
Weber discovered not only that such systematic relationships do exist, but
that they seem to follow the same basic pattern in many different sensory modal-
ities.1 In particular, the change in a stimulus required to produce a just no-
ticeable difference in the subject’s experience appears to stand in a constant
proportion to the comparison stimulus, i.e.
∆S
S
= k,
where ∆S is the change in stimulus strength, S is the absolute value of the
comparison stimulus, and k is a constant which differs for each sensory modality.
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As a simple illustration of this principle, consider the change in the sensation of
brightness caused by the lighting of a candle. In a dark room, a quite dramatic
change occurs, in a well lit room, hardly any. Here, the darkness or lightness
of the room is the standard of comparison S and the change in stimulus ∆S
is measured by the number of candles lit. The fact that a greater change in
stimulus (i.e. more candles) is needed to produce a noticeable difference in
sensation when S is large (the well lit room) is a direct consequence of Weber’s
principle. Weber was able to quantify sensitivity to differences by measuring k
in different experimental conditions. For example, in experiment one, condition
one, Weber measured k = 1/30. In condition two, when muscle activity was
allowed to contribute to assessments of heaviness, he measured k = 1/40 (Weber,
1846, p. 220).
Fechner dubbed Weber’s discovery “Weber’s Law” and discussed the empir-
ical evidence, both for and against it, in detail. He was well aware that it holds
only approximately for many sensory modalities and fails to hold entirely in oth-
ers (Fechner, 1860a, Ch. IX). Nevertheless, he recognized that Weber’s Law had
value as a precise hypothesis against which quantitative empirical data could
be assessed.
In order to further this project, Fechner supplemented Weber’s Law with
a powerful, but controversial, assumption. He assumed that just noticeable
differences measured against different comparison stimuli correspond to equal
changes in the intensity of experience. This allowed Fechner to interpret We-
ber’s Law as describing a relationship between changes in stimulus strength and
changes in sensation:
∆I = k
∆S
S
,
where ∆I is the change in intensity of sensation. By taking the integral, he
transformed this into a formula characterizing the relationship between experi-
ence and stimulus.
I = k log
S
S0
S0 here is the absolute threshold, the smallest stimulus value at which a sen-
sation is noticed. Although later dubbed “Fechner’s Law” by his followers,
Fechner himself called this a “measurement formula.” Since it “permits the
amount of sensation to be calculated from the relative amounts of the funda-
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mental stimulus,” it can provide “a measurement of sensation” (Fechner, 1860b,
p. 75).
Although Fechner’s mathematics is sound, it is important to note that his
assumption that all increments ∆I are equal in size represents an arbitrary con-
ventional choice. It is not an hypothesis which can be empirically tested, merely
a stipulation which allows Fechner to use stimulus size as a proxy for measuring
sensation. However tendentious, this assumption opens the door for the mathe-
matical analysis of psychophysical data and generates precise predictions about
just noticeable differences which can be empirically tested.
The types of sensation examined by Fechner and Weber all vary along a
single qualitative dimension. Sensations of loudness, brightness, pain, etc. all
vary only in intensity, consequently, we can employ Fechner’s methods in order
to measure the relevant constant k, and allow discrepancies with Weber’s Law
to direct us toward a more nuanced mathematical analysis. In order to do the
same for the sensation of color, however, more is required.
2 What’s So Difficult about Measuring Color?
A presupposition behind Weber-style investigation of the experience of heavi-
ness, brightness, etc. is that sensation in these domains has roughly the struc-
ture of a linear order. For any two sensations of loudness a and b, where i(x) rep-
resents the intensity of sensation x, either i(a) < i(b), i(a) > i(b), or i(a) = i(b).
This feature does not hold for our sensations of color. Consider a rich orange
sensation o and a pale yellow sensation y. The orange sensation is more red, or at
least closer to red, than the yellow sensation, o >R y. Yet the yellow sensation is
closer to white, i.e. much lighter than, the orange sensation, y >L o. There is no
translation between these two orderings: lightness cannot be derived from degree
of redness, nor vice versa. So it looks like we need at least two distinct orderings
to characterize color experience, maybe more. How should we determine the
right geometric structure here? This section traces the development of the idea
that color experiences form a geometric space of varying curvature, the structure
of which can be determined empirically.
A critical thread in the development of more nuanced ideas about color space
begins with Kant. Unfortunately, Kant’s own discussion of the experience of
color was relatively limited. He characterized the sensation of color in terms
of intensive magnitudes. These are magnitudes because they have a greater or
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lesser degree, but they are “intensive” because they vary in intensity (in contrast
to the “extensive” magnitudes of space and time).2 There is one such scale of
intensive magnitude associated with each possible color. “Every color, e.g. red,
has a degree, which, however small it may be, is never the smallest, and it is the
same with warmth, with the moment of gravity, etc.” (A169, B211). Although
the particular quality of a sensation is purely a posteriori, this structure, of
being able to take on various degrees of value, from zero upwards in intensity,
is deduced by Kant a priori :
All sensations are thus, as such, given only a posteriori, but their
property of having a degree can be cognized a priori. It is remarkable
that we can cognize a priori of all magnitudes in general only a
single quality, namely continuity, but that in all quality (the real
of appearances) we can cognize a priori nothing more than their
intensive quantity, namely that they have a degree, and everything
else is left to experience. (A176, B218)
Kant proposes to determine the structural features of color perception a priori,
and concludes that the experience of any particular color may vary continuously
in degree from a zero point. Kant leaves out, however, any discussion of how
different colors relate to each other.
Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) developed Kant’s ideas in two impor-
tant directions. First, he argued that the structure of color experience cannot
be determined a priori, but must be discovered empirically (c.f. Lenoir, 2006,
pp. 148ff ). Second, he supplemented Kant’s analysis of intensities with a dis-
cussion of the role of similarities between color experiences. Herbart’s ideas on
color were shaped during his time at Go¨ttingen, where he studied from 1801 to
1809. After a professorship at Ko¨nigsberg (the same chair held by Kant), he
returned to Go¨ttingen in 1833 where he remained until his death.
At Go¨ttingen, Herbart was exposed to the ideas of Tobias Mayer (1723–
1762). In the eighteenth century, the idea that colors should be arranged in
a two dimensional space (as opposed to merely ordered along a line) was still
young, with the first significant proposal being Newton’s color circle (first edition
of the Opticks, 1704, see discussion in Section 3). Mayer represents another im-
portant benchmark. He arranged hues into an equilateral triangle, with yellow,
red, and blue at the vertices, and points in the interior representing mixtures of
these three proportional to their distances from them. This base triangle was
supplemented by a stack of gradually diminishing lighter versions in one direc-
tion and darker in the other, forming one of the first three dimensional color
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solids, a double tetrahedron (Kuehni and Schwarz, 2008, pp. 72–3).
Mayer was a professor at the University of Go¨ttingen from 1751, and his
followers continued to lecture on his system there for many decades after his
death. His system influenced Thomas Young,3 who studied at Go¨ttingen in
1795 and 1796, and it influenced Herbart, who realized the challenge it posed
to Kant’s analysis of color experience.
In order to combine Kant’s insight into intensive magnitudes with Mayer’s
analysis of color space, Herbart needed a unified framework for analyzing both
the degree of a sensation and the similarity between distinct sensations. To
solve this problem, he introduced the concept of a series of transitions. By
following series of sensations, we can learn the structure of possibilities in a
sensory domain. Furthermore, the following of a series is an empirical endeavor,
and so the structure of color perception which for Kant was discovered a priori
becomes, for Herbart, discoverable a posteriori. After comparing the type of
series one can follow through space with those one can follow through time,
number, and “degree or intensive magnitude” (the Kantian magnitudes), he
remarks:
Less distinct, but nevertheless indispensable, is the series produced
by the putting together of sensations of the same kind according to
the possibility of transition from one to another. From this we have
the tone series . . . . Similar to it would be the color surface between
the three primary colors, yellow, red, and blue, if we knew certainly
whether all the colors were connected with the grades of difference
between light and dark (perhaps we should say black and white),
and could be traced back to those three; or whether the color realm
does not rather require a third dimension. (Herbart, 1834, pp. 58–9)
Transitions across similar sensations motivate organizing them into a richer
structure than can be found by just considering degrees of intensity. In the case
of sound, the series of possible tones (organized by pitch) is an example; in the
case of color, Mayer’s triangular color surface. Notice that there is uncertainty
here—waiting to be discovered empirically is whether the space of possible
colors requires a third dimension.
Herbart outlines a general empirical procedure for determining series via
judgments, illustrating it in the domain of color experience. (In the following A
is a determinable, e.g. color, while a, b, c, etc. are its determinants, the specific
values it can take, e.g. brick-red, vermilion, puce, etc.).
A multitude of such judgments as A is a, A is b, A is c, A is d, etc.,
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. . . form a series; since the a, b, c, d, blend in different degrees accord-
ing to their lesser or greater contrasts (e.g., the three judgments—
this fruit is green, that yellow, a third yellowish green—blend in such
a way as to bring with them the colors in their orders—green, yellow-
ish green, and yellow; for between yellow and green the opposition
is the strongest, consequently the blending the least). . . . The more
the series of characteristics form and separate in this way, through
the comparison of similarities, and in part of differences, so much
the sooner will it be possible, by means of them, to determine the
content of the complexes, or to approach the definitions of ideas.
(Herbart, 1834, p. 147)
This passage was written before Fechner’s codification of psychophysical meth-
ods, and fails to suggest any experimental procedure as rigorous as those em-
ployed by Weber. Nevertheless, the general strategy of using similarity judg-
ments to explore the structure of a space of sensory experiences is essentially
that of Weber and Fechner. Furthermore, Herbart, no doubt under the influ-
ence of Mayer, has emphasized the possibility that such similarity judgments
may reveal an arbitrarily complex space, as a opposed to a simple linear ar-
rangement.
Herbart’s method, following a series of transitions, is limited in what it
can reveal about a geometrical space. In particular, only topological structure
(which points are connected to which other points) could possibly be revealed
by following Herbart’s suggestions. But a full understanding of the experience
of color demands more than this; it demands also a knowledge of the metrical
structure of color space, i.e. the distances between points. For example, there
is some loose topological sense in which yellow and orange are “next to” each
other, while yellow and blue are not. Much more interesting, however, would be
to determine of a particular shade of orange whether it is closer to a particular
shade of red or to a particular shade of yellow. Such a determination would
require a meaningful metric for the space of possible color experiences.
In 1850 and 1851, Herbart’s collected works were published and had a pro-
found effect on Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann (1826–1866), then studying
at Go¨ttingen. He even developed his own theory of the relationship between
mind and world along Herbartian lines (Ehm, 2010). In the lecture delivered on
the occasion of his Habilitation, Riemann introduced a general framework for
distinguishing topological from metrical structure in terms of manifolds, giving
precision to ideas Herbart had discussed only loosely (Ferreiro´s, 1999, pp. 41–7)
.
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Riemann begins with the concept of a manifold of specific “determinations”4
and emphasizes the importance of Herbartian “transitions” for analyzing the
connectedness of this structure, e.g. whether it is continuous or discrete.
Notions of magnitude are only possible where there is an antecedent
general concept which admits of different ways of determination. Ac-
cording as a continuous transition does or does not take place among
these determinations, from one to another, they form a continuous
or discrete manifold; the individual determinations are called points
in the first case, in the last case elements, of the manifold.. . . so few
and far between are the occasions for forming notions whose de-
terminations make up a continuous manifold, that the only simple
notions whose determinations form a multiply extended manifold
are the positions of perceived objects and colours. (Riemann, 1868,
p. 653)
Riemann makes a general comparison between physical space (“the positions of
perceived objects”) and the space of possible colors. In both cases, there are
different determinations which may obtain (specific locations, specific colors),
and in both cases, the transition through these points is continuous. These ideas
are already present in Kant and Herbart, but Riemann supplements them with
a discussion of metrical structure.
Definite parts of a manifold, distinguished by a mark or by a bound-
ary, are called quanta. Their comparison with regard to quantity is
accomplished in the case of discrete magnitudes by counting, in the
case of continuous magnitudes by measuring. Measuring consists in
the superposition of the magnitudes to be compared; it therefore
requires a means of transporting one magnitude as the standard for
another. In the absence of this, two magnitudes can only be com-
pared when one is a part of the other; in which case also we can only
determine the more or less, and not the how much. (translation in
Ferreiro´s, 1999, pp. 68–9)
The essential point here is that metric structure requires a standard for com-
parison. Furthermore, this standard must in some sense be mobile, so that it
can be compared directly with the area to be measured, i.e. superimposed upon
it. Without such a standard, distances cannot be measured.
Though the point may seem trivial when considering the measurement of,
say, physical distances with a ruler, its significance for the psychophysical in-
vestigation of color is profound. In particular, what should play the role of a
measurement standard for subjective experience? Furthermore, how could we
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possibly take a magnitude from one area of the domain and superimpose it on
another? Weber’s standard of comparison was the just noticeable difference.
This standard seems to avoid the problem of superposition by appealing to the
smallest possible distance. If smallest possible distances are always the same
size (they are, after all, the “smallest”), we do not need to move one such dis-
tance around and hold it against the others to ensure they are “the same.”
As discussed above, however, the claim that just noticeable differences measure
equal changes in experience cannot be given empirical meaning. It constitutes
an arbitrary stipulation, which is only pragmatically justified by its power to
generate precise quantitative predictions.
Nevertheless, additional assumptions are needed in order to measure the
metric of color experience. Fechner’s strategy only measures local distances,
but how do these measurements fit together? We need some theory of the gross
structure of a sensory domain if we are to use assessments of just noticeable
differences as evidence for its metric. Without a theory of the gross structure of
a sensory domain, we cannot define linear sequences through it. And without
linear sequences, we cannot apply the method of just noticeable differences. In
the case of color, we do not know antecedently if the space of possible color
experiences is circular, triangular, or some other shape. What is its dimension-
ality? What are its symmetries? Without some strategy for first answering
these questions, we cannot apply Fechner’s methods to color experience. It
was one of Helmholtz’s great achievements to develop such a strategy, refining
methods first pioneered by Newton to produce the first precise determination
of linear sequences through color space.
3 Helmholtz Breaks the Symmetry
In the early 1850s, while Riemann studied Herbart at Go¨ttingen, Hermann von
Helmholtz (1821–1894) was studying him at Ko¨nigsberg (Lenoir, 2006, pp. 148–
60, c.f. Hatfield, 1990, p. 180). It was during this period that many of his
crucial experiments involving the structure of color experience were performed.
Although Helmholtz only came into contact with Riemann’s ideas later in his
career, his experiments forced him to distinguish metric from topological struc-
ture. He was the first to carry out Herbart’s proposal and perform empirical
measurements on the psychological distances between color experiences. Al-
though these measurements failed to produce a metric in the strict sense, they
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succeeded in demonstrating that color space is asymmetrical.
Helmholtz’s understanding of geometrical structure agrees completely with
Herbart’s empiricist take on Kant, as can be seen from the concluding remarks
of Helmholtz (1876). There, he emphasizes that “[t]he axioms of geometry,
taken by themselves out of all connection with mechanical propositions, repre-
sent no relations of real things.” Nevertheless, “[a]s soon as certain principles
of mechanics are conjoined with the axioms of geometry, we obtain a system
of propositions which has real import, and which can be verified or overturned
by empirical observations” (Helmholtz, 1876, p. 683). No less problematic than
spatial structure is the structure of color experience, which Helmholtz acknowl-
edges as the source of his interest in non-Euclidean geometries.
Whilst Riemann entered upon this new field from the side of the
most general and fundamental questions of analytical geometry, I
myself arrived at similar conclusions, partly from seeking to repre-
sent in space the system of colours, involving the comparison of one
threefold extended aggregate with another, and partly from inquiries
on the origin of our ocular measure for distance in the field of vision.
(Helmholtz, 1876, p. 675)
A “threefold extended aggregate” is just a three dimensional space. What
were the two such spaces for representing color which Helmholtz was driven
to compare? The answer to this question will emerge from an examination of
Helmholtz’s experiments on color mixtures.
Helmholtz’s experiments on color mixtures were driven by challenges from
Hermann Grassmann (1809–1877).5 Grassmann had added mathematical pre-
cision to Newton’s analysis of color space, which predicted that every color has
a complement, i.e. another color with which it mixes to produce white.6 An ex-
periment by Helmholtz in the early 1850s seemed to demonstrate that this is not
the case, but rather that many colors have no complement at all. Grassmann
(1853) criticized Helmholtz’s result with a formal proof, based on two very basic
assumptions about the continuity of color space, that every color must have a
complement. Grassmann’s two assumptions were:
1. “[E]very impression of color of this kind may be analysed into three math-
ematically determinable elements—the tint, the intensity of the color, and
the intensity of the intermixed white. The various tints form a continuous
series of such a kind, that when we start from one color of this series and
proceed forward, we finally arrive at the original color.” (p. 435)
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2. “[I ]f one of two mingling lights be continuously altered (whilst the other
remains unchanged), the impression of the mixed light also is continuously
changed.” (p. 437, italics in the original)
Grassmann clearly identifies these as “assumptions.” Not only are they natural
assumptions to make, however, but they were shared by all serious researchers
into color at the time, including Helmholtz.
In the next section of the paper, Grassmann attempts to use Helmholtz’s
own results to predict the complementary colors which Helmholtz failed to pro-
duce. For example, Helmholtz could not produce white by mixing red with
any other color, but he found that red mixed with blue produced a pale violet,
while red mixed with green produced a pale yellow. Grassmann argues that
since there is a continuous transition between pale violet and pale yellow which
passes through white, there must be a color lying on the continuous transi-
tion between blue and green which will produce this white in complement with
red. Unfortunately, he cannot pinpoint the error in Helmholtz’s experiment,
concluding only “There is consequently a deficiency here” (Grassmann, 1853,
p. 440). However, Helmholtz checked the continuous transition from blue to
green for a complement to red and failed to find one: there must have been
a hidden assumption in his experimental procedure which prevented him from
finding the complement Grassmann’s analysis predicts.
This hidden assumption, which Grassmann failed to emphasize, but Helmholtz
eventually discovered, is that color space is circular. This assumption erro-
neously appears to follow as a conclusion if one confuses topological with metri-
cal considerations. The error here dates back to Newton, whose system Grass-
mann merely formalized, yet was difficult to identify since its derivation was
always left implicit. In fact, as long as one is only investigating the topological
properties of color space, as in Grassmann’s proof, there is no error: color space
is topologically equivalent to a circle. Although the existence of complementary
colors can be demonstrated via a purely topological proof, however, their deter-
mination demands the introduction of metric considerations. Ironically, Newton
himself, having introduced the assumption of circularity, discovered the very
same discrepancy between theory and experiment as Helmholtz.7
Proposition IV of Book One, Part II, of the Opticks states the basic proper-
ties of compound colors. Newton performed a series of experiments which first
used a prism to separate sunlight into a spectrum, then isolated “homogeneal”
( monochromatic) lights by selectively passing parts of the spectrum through
slits in black paper. This allowed him to determine that
13
Figure 1: Newton’s color circle (Newton, 1730, p. 155)
. . . Colours by how much they are more compounded by so much are
they less full and intense, and by too much Composition they may be
diluted and weaken’d till they cease, and the Mixture becomes white
or grey. There may be also Colours produced by Composition, which
are not fully like any of the Colours of homogeneal Light. (Newton,
1730, p. 132)
Intensity is not a technical term for Newton, but he seems to informally identify
it with distance from white. Therefore, all the (maximally intense) homogeneous
colors should be maximally distant from white. If one allows for a continuity
of color across the red and violet ends of the spectrum, this motivates their
organization into a perfect circle. Mixtures of these colors “dilute” them, this
leaves them different in quality from homogeneous colors (different how? closer
to white). Therefore, mixtures of homogeneous colors fall on the interior of the
circle.
Proposition VI, Problem II, demonstrates how to use a color circle to cal-
culate mixtures of colors. Newton proposes a strategy by analogy with the
calculation of the center of gravity of a physical system. Pick points on the cir-
cle corresponding to the homogeneous colors being mixed. Assign them “mass”
in proportion to the relative quantity (i.e. number of rays) of each color in the
mixture. Finally, calculate the center of gravity of this system. Supposing, for
example, that circles p, q, r, s, t, u, x represent the colors being mixed, with the
size of the respective circles proportional to their “mass” in the mixture, then
Z might be the center of gravity of this system, i.e. the color resulting from this
14
mixture (see Figure 1).
Newton recognized imperfections in this system, acknowledging it as “accu-
rate enough for practice, though not mathematically accurate” (Newton, 1730,
p. 158). Furthermore, Newton acknowledges a crucial lacuna between the em-
pirical predictions of his color circle and the effects he could produce experi-
mentally:
[I]f any two of the primary Colours which in the circle are opposite
to one another be mixed in an equal proportion, the point Z shall
fall upon the center O, and yet the Colour compounded of those
two shall not be perfectly white, but some faint anonymous Colour.
For I could never yet by mixing only two primary Colours produce
a perfect white. (Newton, 1730, p. 156)
Anticipating Grassmann, Newton acknowledges the existence of complementary
colors as a consequence of his model; yet, anticipating Helmholtz, he admits
failure in experimentally producing the predicted effect!
Recognizing the severity of the challenge from Newton and Grassmann,
Helmholtz resumed his experiments with a significantly more subtle appara-
tus. Before, he had assumed that complementary colors could be discovered by
mixing equal quantities of homogeneous light. In his new setup, he abandoned
that assumption.
Helmholtz isolated homogeneous light in the same manner as Newton had, by
first passing sunlight through a prism, then allowing the resulting spectrum to
fall upon a narrow slit which allowed only a single band, or color, of light to pass
through. In order to mix two homogeneous lights, Helmholtz constructed a finely
machined board with two adjustable slits. Both the vertical placement and the
horizontal width of each slit could be precisely adjusted. Changing the vertical
placement of a slit changed the wavelength of light it permitted, while changing
the width of a slit changed the quantity of that light. By focusing the streams
of light passing through this board onto a white surface, Helmholtz was able
to determine the effect of mixing two homogeneous hues of varying quantities.
He discovered that every color indeed has a complement, but that the quantity
of colored light required to produce white when mixing complements varies
systematically with position around the color “circle.”
How should this result be interpreted? Helmholtz preserved the idea that
saturation, or intensity, as measured by distance from white, was a meaningful
quantity. Rather than simply stipulate that homogeneous colors exhibit the
maximum value of this quantity, however, he proposed to identify it with (the
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Figure 2: Helmholtz’s color surface (Helmholtz, 1866, p. 139)
inverse of) the quantity of light required to produce white when mixed with a
fixed quantity of monochromatic light of the complementary color. If less of a
particular light is required to produce white, then, on this definition, the corre-
sponding color is more saturated. This gave Helmholtz a means of measuring
the (relative) distance from white to the edge of the color surface as a function of
wavelength and, correspondingly, a new analysis of the gross structure of color
space (Figure 2).
Here at last we see the two spaces which motivated Helmholtz’s turn toward
non-Euclidean geometry. For the points within Newton’s circle and Helmholtz’s
truncated hyperbola are the same, i.e. the possible colors which a human can
experience. Thus, if distances are treated as uniform (e.g. Euclidean) on one of
these surfaces, they cannot be uniform on the other. How did Helmholtz himself
make sense of the difference?
As to the units of luminosity of light of different colours, in those
cases where the boundary of the colour chart has been designed in
the form of a circle, complementary amounts of the complemen-
tary colours, that is, amounts which produce white when they are
mixed, must be considered as being equal, because by hypothesis
their mixed colour, white, is midway between them.. . .
On the other hand, supposing quantities of light of different
colours are to be considered as being equal, when for a certain abso-
lute intensity of light they look equally bright to the eye, we shall get
an entirely different form for the curve on which the simple colours
lie, like that shown in [Figure 2]. Saturated violet and red must be
farther from white than their less saturated complementary colours,
because, as the eye estimates it, it takes less violet than yellow-green
when we mix these two complementary colours together to get white.
Hence, if white is to be in the position of their centre of gravity, the
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smaller amount of violet must have a longer lever-arm than the larger
amount of yellow-green. (Helmholtz, 1866, pp. 139–40)
Helmholtz makes it clear that he considers the circular structure of the New-
ton color surface to be arbitrary, or at least stipulated rather than discovered.
Even if this structure has some physical motivation, it does not capture the
phenomenal distances between perceived colors. Conversely, the truncated hy-
perbola of Figure 2 represents distances in experience. In particular, by taking
equal quantities of light to measure equal quantities of the respective color, we
can discover inequalities in their respective saturations (where saturation is still
defined as distance from white). We assume that when white is produced by
mixing two complementary colors they are at equal brightness; consequently,
if different quantities of these colors are required to produce white, they lie at
different distances from the center point, white.
How does this fare with respect to the criteria for measurement of an arbi-
trary geometric space as described by Riemann? Helmholtz has used the radial
structure of color space as a standard for comparison of sorts. Since the center
point, white, has a distinguished position, he can use relative distance from
white to determine relative distance from the center point. However, he cru-
cially makes use of a proxy here: quantity of light (measured by width of the
aperture required to make a complementary match in the experiment) is taken
to stand in for (inverse) perceptual distance. If perceived brightness does not
vary linearly with quantity of light, then the radial distances in Helmholtz’s
color space will not actually be meaningful.
Even if we grant Helmholtz success in measuring radial distance, i.e. the
distance of each hue from white, it should be clear that he is still far from
placing a metric on perceptual color space. In particular, what about distances
between hues? In Figure 2, the distance around the circumference between
indigo and violet is almost as great as that between green and orange, yet the
psychological distance (i.e. degree of perceived dissimilarity) in the latter case
is clearly far greater than in the former. An even more problematic region is
that between violet and red—how should the great distance here in Helmholtz’s
space be interpreted? Clearly, distances around the circumference of Figure 2
are not psychologically meaningful.
Nevertheless, there is at least one great achievement of Helmholtz’s empir-
ical work here for our understanding of perceptual color space: he has suc-
ceeded in demonstrating an asymmetry in our experience of color. This also
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was Helmholtz’s assessment of the most important contribution of this work,
as he devotes significantly more discussion to the importance of asymmetries
of saturation across colors than to the geometrical significance of Figure 2 in
his writings.8 Although it is only a rough ordering, his summary of this result
(Helmholtz, 1866, p. 127) is borne out in modern theories of perceptual color
space.
violet > indigo− blue >
[
red
cyan− blue
]
>
[
orange
green
]
> yellow
The greater-than symbol here indicates greater saturation. In modern color
spaces, this two dimensional asymmetry is realized in three dimensions since
“saturation” understood as “distance from white” is captured by two parame-
ters: lightness and chroma, where the former is distance from perceived white
(i.e. relative brightness) and the latter is degree of perceived chromaticity (“col-
orfulness”) independent of brightness (Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982, p. 487).
4 Doing Without Just Noticeable Difference
Helmholtz’s experimental result was a turning point in the application of psy-
chophysical methods to color experience. If two complementary colors are taken
as falling on “opposite” sides of color space, the experiences between them can
be treated as falling on a “straight line” through that space. Mathematically,
this means that variants of Fechner’s measurement formula can be assumed
and used to generate predictions about the metric structure of color space.9
Experimentally, these lines suggest a dimension of comparison along which to
apply Weber’s method of stimulus comparison. As it turns out, the complexity
of color space defeats the straightforward search for just noticeable differences,
motivating the need for new experimental techniques. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to explore the quality of evidence about color experience provided by
variations and weakenings of the psychophysical methods for linear perceptual
spaces—just how much can these methods tell us about the invariances in color
experience across different individuals?
The most serious attempt to measure (something like) just noticeable dif-
ferences across color space as a whole is the work of Wright (1941). Of course,
by the time Wright ran these experiments, much had changed in color science
from the time of Helmholtz. Of particular importance was the establishment of
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Figure 3: Setup for a color matching experiment. On the left, the view from
above. On the right, the stimulus as seen by the subject. (Wandell, 1995, p. 81)
a standard color space in 1931 by the Commission internationale de l’e´clairage,
based largely on data collected earlier by Wright himself (see Fairman et al.,
1997 and Brill, 1998). Although it fails to represent psychological distances
accurately, the CIE 1931 color space continues to be of great importance today
for the organization and reporting of color data. It is in this space that Wright
made his measurements of noticeable differences.
The basic method for measuring color experiences is still in terms of compar-
isons between stimuli. Helmholtz’s ability to isolate homogeneous stimuli from
sunlight had been limited by the spectral makeup of the sunlight itself and the
precision with which his machined slits could isolate narrow bands from it. Once
technological developments allowed the precise measurement and control of ar-
tificial lights, a more thorough and controllable experimental setup was made
possible, one not limited to bands of (roughly) homogeneous light. A subject
looks through a narrow opening (width of the opening affects results) onto a
bipartite white field. In the classic color matching experiment (Figure 3), a test
light which can be arbitrarily complex in its wavelength composition, is shone
onto one half of the bipartite field. On the other are three “primary” lights. The
subject is able to adjust the intensity of each of these lights independently, and
does so until the two sides of the field are perceptually identical. As it turns
out, the exact composition of the primary lights does not matter (e.g. they
need not correspond to “the” primary colors “red,” “green,” and “blue”), so
long as they satisfy certain independence assumptions (i.e. are sufficiently “dif-
ferent”). If these independence assumptions are satisfied, subjects can perform
exact matches with any given test light whatsoever.
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D
65
Figure 4: The CIE 1931 color space; some single-wavelength colors have been
indicated around the edge of the surface. Note that no point in the interior
corresponds to subjective “white” simpliciter, since assessments of white are
context dependent. However, D65 is a CIE standard illuminant which closely
approximates ordinary “white” daylight, adopted later on the recommendation
of Judd et al., 1964.
Unfortunately, exact matches in a color matching experiment performed with
real lights sometimes require “subtraction” of a primary. Experimentally, this
can be achieved by adding that primary to the opposite side of the bipartite
field. The CIE 1931 color space first averaged together results from a number of
subjects on this task to form the CIE 1931 “standard observer,” then linearly
transformed this space into one involving three hypothetical primaries, X, Y , Z.
Although these primaries (basis vectors for the space) are not actually physically
realizable, they allow the representation of all possible colors via purely positive
linear combinations. This space is usually represented in the (x, y) plane, where
x = XX+Y+Z and y =
Y
X+Y+Z (Figure 4).
Even before the CIE 1931 color space was adopted, it was recognized that
distances within it do not correspond to perceived differences between colors.
Nevertheless, any attempt during this period to define a psychologically plausi-
ble color space was defeated by a lack of uniform data. For example, Judd (1932,
1935) emphasizes the unsatisfactory nature of data on this problem (often due to
a lack of sufficient precision in the specification of the stimuli or the experimental
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setup). Despite this difficulty, Judd suggested a transformation of preexisting
color space into one of greater psychological homogeneity which later formed
the basis for the 1976 CIELUV space, recommended by the Commission inter-
nationale de l’e´clairage as a standard for representing color differences amongst
lights. Although CIELUV represents a dramatic improvement over the CIE
1931 space, it nevertheless is far from satisfactory as a psychologically plausible
model of color experience (see discussion in Fairchild, 2005, pp. 194–5).
In response to the worries expressed by Judd and the Commission interna-
tionale de l’e´clairage as a whole, Wright set out to collect a sufficiently precise,
uniform data set of just noticeable differences in color space. In particular, his
goal was to traverse a number of straight lines through the CIE 1931 color
space, measuring just noticeable differences along the way. He rapidly dropped
the restriction to “just” noticeable differences (a point to be discussed below),
collecting instead data on differences judged to be perceptually equal. Wright
collected data on himself and three post-graduate students, all specialists in
color science or optics.
Wright’s experimental setup closely matches that of Figure 3. Instead of
a test light on one side and three primaries on the other, however, each side
of the field was illuminated by two monochromatic lights, of the same two
wavelengths, λ1 and λ2. These two wavelengths defined the endpoints of a line
through the CIE 1931 color space, and any mixture between the two lights would
fall along it. After the lights were adjusted such that both sides of the field were
subjectively identical, the subject adjusted the value of his λ1 light only until a
noticeable difference with the test side of the field was detected. This light was
returned to its starting point, and then the subject adjusted it in the opposite
direction, again until a noticeable difference was detected. The whole procedure
was repeated three times and averages taken in order to determine the step size.
Allowing the subject to adjust only only one of the two lights at a time
ensured that directionality along the line of interest through the CIE 1931 color
space was controlled. The intervals reported were essentially twice the noticeable
difference, with the test light serving as the interval’s mean. The data for Wright
himself can be seen plotted within the CIE 1931 color space in Figure 5.
Why did Wright abandon just noticeable differences in favor of small notice-
able differences, judged to be psychologically equivalent? The decision to rely on
this “less exacting” measure than the just noticeable difference was motivated
by the extraordinary number of measurements that needed to be made.
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Figure 5: Equal perceptual differences graphed into the CIE 1931 color space.
Each bar indicates two noticeable differences, as measured on either side of
a mean color stimulus by Wright. Noticeable differences were assessed to be
equal for each measurement. As such, the changes in bar length here indicate
the extent to which the CIE 1931 color space distorts psychologically uniform
distances in perceptual color space. (Wright, 1941, p. 99)
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It was decided that in making a step, the criterion used should be
rather larger than is usually understood by a just noticeable step.
In recording the latter, something akin to a sporting instinct can
be introduced in an attempt to discern as minute a difference as
possible, but this takes time and imposes a considerable strain on the
observer. If the standard is made less exacting, the strain is reduced
and a lengthy investigation can be completed more successfully. On
the other hand, it is probably less easy to maintain a consistent
size for the step; in the case of the author, for example, the steps
recorded in the first two or three weeks of the investigation were
appreciably smaller than in the later months. In time, a reasonably
settled judgment was attained, and all the observations reported here
were recorded after this had been achieved. (Wright, 1941, p. 96)
Wright’s response to Riemann’s demand for a standard which can be trans-
ported across the domain depends upon a subjective assessment of difference
size. As such, it appears to be a more suspect form of measurement than the
just noticeable difference (though see discussion by MacAdam below). In order
to ensure these measurements were up to Fechnerian standards of uniformity,
Wright introduced several checks on the constancy of psychological step size.
One check was to return to the same lines several weeks later and retest select
interval sizes. If agreement between the check and the original data was not
good, the entire line would be remeasured. A second check involved compari-
son of Wright’s data with that of his post-graduate students (who unfortunately
only collected data on some of the lines which Wright himself tested). Although
Wright and his students did not each choose exactly the same step size to report,
after normalization, there was substantial agreement in the general pattern of
changes in step size across color space.
These considerations indicate why the experiment has never been repeated.
The effort and time commitment are enormous. Furthermore, individual differ-
ences ensure that there is no easy way to integrate partial data sets gathered
under different experimental conditions.
[I]t would not be very satisfactory to determine further isolated sets
of results and fit them piecemeal into existing data; rather, the whole
field should be tested afresh by one group of observers under one set
of observing conditions. (Wright, 1941, p. 94)
Nevertheless, a number of variations on this basic psychophysical method
have been used to explore the metric of subjective color space. MacAdam
(1942), for example, proposed calculating just noticeable difference from the
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standard deviation in repeated color matching experiments. His motivation
was dissatisfaction with the consistency provided by attempts to measure just
noticeable difference directly. Interestingly, he found greater consistency when
using noticeable differences of the sort employed by Wright, though the tedium
of such measurements was overwhelming.
Attempts were made to adjust color differences to equal certain
standard color differences, several times greater than just notice-
able.. . . This criterion provided more consistent results than the cri-
terion of just noticeability, but was exceedingly tedious and required
extensive training of the observer. (MacAdam, 1942, p. 257)
MacAdam’s solution was simply to perform the same set of color matching
experiments over and over again (approximately 50 times each) with a sophis-
ticated measurement apparatus. This allowed him to make very precise mea-
surements of the setting used by the subject in each match, and from that
to calculate the standard deviation. The result was a sequence of ellipses when
plotted into the CIE 1931 color space, each of which represented a region of per-
ceptual indifference in a color matching experiment. The orientation and size
of the ellipses revealed many of the same distortions as Wright’s measurements.
Unlike Wright and Judd, MacAdam argued that no simple transformation of
CIE 1931 space into one with a perceptually meaningful distance metric was
possible,10 comparing CIE 1931 space to a plane map of the earth’s surface,
which is useful despite distortions. Although MacAdam’s ellipses continue to
be important for color science, they are currently believed to be a consequence
of lower level physiological processes than those which determine perceptual
judgments of noticeable difference (Kuehni, 2003, p. 228).
Another strategy was implemented by Wyszecki and Fielder (1971), who
used a color matching setup with a tripartite viewing field. Two test lights (i)
and (j) were given, and the subject was asked to adjust the primaries governing
the third part of the field such that the resulting color (i, j) was a perceptual
distance from each of (i) and (j) equivalent to the distance between (i) and (j).
This covered the CIE 1931 color space with “perceptual equilateral triangles,”
which, needless to say, do not appear equilateral when plotted within that space.
Again, as might be expected, the general pattern of distortions agrees with
that measured by Wright and Judd, though the level of detail in the results of
Wyszecki and Fielder is significantly greater.
Variations such as these on the basic color matching experimental paradigm
have allowed a surprisingly precise (though still incomplete) mapping of the
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metric of perceptual color space. Just as in Weber’s original experiments,
uniform distances in the physical stimuli correspond to irregular distances in
subjective experience, and the qualitative differences in these discrepancies for
different parts of the spectrum motivate an asymmetrical model of color ex-
perience. But how certain can we be that these same asymmetries appear in
all human visual systems? Subjects do not perform identically on any of the
experiments reported above. Even in the complementary color experiment re-
ported by Helmholtz, variations in the exact wavelength and quantity of light
needed to produce white can vary across observers. Helmholtz himself reported
some of these discrepancies in the second edition of the Handbuch. In a table
of comparisons (Helmholtz, 1866, p. 128), it can be seen that the discrepancies
are relatively small, less than 10 nm even at their greatest.
In the case of Wright (1941), the agreement between his own measurements
and those of his students was remarkable. For most lines through the CIE 1931
space, the plots of ∆l (change in step size) against l (position on the line being
measured) are parallel and fall very close together. Parallelism here indicates
that changes in psychological distance vary in the same direction with changes
in the stimulus, while closeness indicates agreement between stimulus values at
which the change occurs. The greatest amount of divergence can be found in
the lower right quandrant of CIE 1931 space, where occasionally ∆l grew for
some subjects while shrinking for others. Another area of disagreement was in
the relative size of noticeable differences as measured around the circumference
of the CIE 1931 space (Figure 6). Nevertheless, these fluctuations seem minor
compared to the large scale agreement about the pattern of distortion in CIE
1931 space.
MacAdam (1942) only gathered data from two subjects. His data show
the same pattern of deviation as in Wright (1941); the general shape of curves
graphing size of standard deviation against changes in stimulus wavelength is
essentially the same for both subjects, though there are minor discrepancies.
We may draw the same conclusion as with Wright’s data: although there are
differences in the exact internal structure of subjective color space, the overall
pattern of its distortion compared to a physically uniform stimulus space appears
to be the same across observers.
Wyszecki and Fielder (1971) include the most thorough discussion of vari-
ance in their data. Their experiment involved three subjects. In order to judge
consistency in performance on their task, they repeated the experiment and
calculated MacAdam ellipses for the third vertex of each “perceptual equilat-
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Figure 6: The degree of agreement on change in step size (∆l) as a function of
wavelength in the data collected by Wright and his students (each line represents
a different subject). The x-axis represents position on the circumference of the
CIE 1931 color space. (Wright, 1941, p. 103)
eral triangle.” Before testing variance across subjects, however, they examined
consistency in the performance of a single subject on the same match performed
on different days. They were surprised at how much variance they found, more
than they had expected from a prior statistical analysis.
We must accept the fact that visual color-difference-matching data
obtained by the same observer on different occasions can be consid-
erably less precisely predicted than the statistical estimates would
indicate. The functioning of the visual mechanism appears to be
affected by parameters that depend upon time and possibly other
events and circumstances not accounted for in the model underlying
statistical inferences (Wyszecki and Fielder, 1971, p. 1510)
As expected, agreement for the same subject was still greater than across sub-
jects. When comparing the results of different subjects, agreement on what con-
stitutes a perceptual equilateral triangle occurs about 50% of the time, within
the subject’s margin of error. This is determined by looking at the degree of
overlap between MacAdam ellipses across subjects. Only in very few cases was
there no overlap in the MacAdam ellipses for two subjects when performing
the same triangular match. Although size and shape of ellipses did not seem
correlated across subjects, the orientation of ellipses was strongly correlated
(Wyszecki and Fielder, 1971, pp. 1510–3).
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This section has surveyed some refinements in experimental techniques for
measuring distances through perceptual color space. A concurrent develop-
ment occurred in mathematical techniques for manipulating and analyzing psy-
chophysical data. These range from suggested replacements of Fechner’s mea-
surement formula (e.g. Stevens, 1957) to computational techniques for extract-
ing metric information from similarity judgments (for instance, via multidimen-
sional scaling, as in Shepard, 1962a,b). Ultimately, the success or failure of these
mathematical models rests upon the empirical support of experiments such as
those discussed here.
5 Conclusion: Do you see what I see?
What objective conclusions can psychophysical methods support about the sub-
jective experiences of different observers? The insight that judgments about
the comparative features of two experiences for a single subject can themselves
be compared across subjects makes the relationship between subjective experi-
ences available as an object of scientific study. While psychophysical methods
for quantifying these comparisons do not legitimate any conclusions about the
intrinsic features of particular subjective experiences, they do legitimate con-
clusions about two distinct types of extrinsic features of experience: 1. the
structural relationship between possible experiences; 2. the causal relationship
between these experiences and the world.
The structural relationship between subjective experiences was initially held
to be determinable a priori. Weber’s investigation of heaviness, for example,
presupposes that the intensity of experiences of heaviness is a single parameter
which organizes those experiences into a linear order. This assumption allows
him to explore systematic features of the causal relationship between experi-
ences of heaviness and weights in the world. This methodology supported both
qualitative conclusions about this relationship (e.g. that temperature causally
affects judgments of heaviness) and quantitative conclusions (as captured by
Weber’s Law).
The more complex example of color experience, however, motivated the idea
that the structural relationship between experiences needs to be investigated em-
pirically. The crucial conceptual step required to get this program off the ground
was a clear distinction between topological and metrical structure. Mathemati-
cally, this distinction is articulated clearly by Riemann. Working independently,
27
Helmholtz discovers the same distinction in his attempts to reconcile topologi-
cal conclusions derived from the continuity of color experience by Newton and
Grassmann with empirical data on color combinations.
With this distinction in hand, we can see that Weber’s just noticeable differ-
ence is a metrical concept; it provides a measure of distance between subjective
experiences. Natural generalizations of Weber’s concept turn out to be more
suitable for the investigation of color experience. As we have seen, MacAdam in-
vestigated regions of indistinguishability in color experience, and Wyszecki and
Fielder used the distance between two color stimuli as a standard by which to
measure triples of equidistant points in color space. In each of these examples,
however, some manifestation of Riemann’s basic insight about metric structure
can be found: a standard of comparison which can be applied in different re-
gions of the space is required to measure distances. Weber’s least distinguishable
distance, MacAdam’s greatest indistinguishable distance, and the subjectively
equal distances of Wright and Wyszecki and Fielder all instantiate this basic
idea.
Since psychophysical experiments measure the structural relationship be-
tween psychological possibilities, they can be used to investigate similarities
in this structure across subjects. Additionally, psychophysical methodology
presupposes a causal relationship between stimuli and experience, and there-
fore indirectly investigates the similarity in this causal relationship across sub-
jects. Consequently, the greater the agreement in subjects’ performance on
psychophysical tasks, the greater the similarity between their respective expe-
riences with respect to extrinsic structural and causal features. In the case
of color, subjects presented with the same sets of stimuli at uniform physical
distances report the same patterns of distortion in the psychological distances
between their experiences. This broad agreement on the asymmetries in color
experience motivates the conclusion that the structure of possible experiences of
color for different subjects is the same up to a very high degree of approximation.
So, in what sense is your experience of color and mine the same? In the sense
that your possible experiences of color, as identified by proxy with the stimuli
which cause them, stand in the same metrical and topological relationship to
each other as my experiences of color, similarly identified. Although the in-
trinsic features of your color experience and mine may conceivably differ when
viewing the same stimulus, when considered in terms of their extrinsic relation-
ships to each other and to the world, our experiences of color are essentially the
same.
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Notes
1Principles similar to Weber’s Law as described here had been proposed before for specific
types of sensation (for example, by the astronomer Pierre Bouguer (1698–1758) in the case of
brightness). Weber is considered to be the first to propose it as a general principle governing
many distinct sensory modalities, however.
2Fechner also employs this distinction. Note that Kant and Fechner’s usage of “intensive”
and “extensive” here differs from modern usage in physics and measurement theory.
3Thomas Young (1773–1829) developed his own triangular representation of color, replac-
ing Mayer’s three primary colors with red, green, and violet. He posited the existence of three
fibers in the retina which vibrate sympathetically with light of the corresponding wavelengths,
a theory which was later refined by Helmholtz. The Young-Helmholtz theory has been con-
firmed by experiments on the neurophysiology of the retina, though it is not sufficient to fully
account for the phenomenology of color.
4In the following quote from Riemann, 1868, the term “specializations” (for Bestim-
mungsweisen) has been replaced with “determinations,” following the corrections and dis-
cussion of Ferreiro´s, 1999, p. 63.
5The interaction between Helmholtz and Grassmann on color mixtures is discussed in detail
by Lenoir (2006), from which this section has greatly benefited.
6At issue here is the mixing of colored lights, not of pigments, though it would actually
be in this very series of experiments that Helmholtz himself would first clearly articulate the
distinction between lights and pigments when it comes to color mixtures. Previously, the two
had frequently been confused or conflated, even in the experiments of Newton.
7A point noticed at the time, see, for example, note III appended to Maxwell, 1857.
8For Helmholtz, these asymmetries provide crucial evidence for determining the wave-
lengths to which the three color receptors in the retina are sensitive (c.f. endnote 3). We set
this issue aside here as our focus is on the phenomenology of color experience rather than the
physiology of color vision.
9 Helmholtz (1892) provides an analysis of the “shortest lines” through color space, as-
suming a weakened version of Fechner’s measurement formula. This work was critiqued and
expanded by Silberstein (1938), who demonstrated that “the whole domain of colors metri-
cized according to Fechner’s law cannot be represented without distortion by a Euclidean
three-dimensional model” (82). In 1943, Silberstein compared his mathematical results with
the data of MacAdam (1942) (discussed below), which he claims experimentally establish that
the color surface can be represented by a differential quadratic equation, just as Helmholtz
(1892) had hypothesized. This claim should be tempered somewhat by the concerns about
the exact psychological meaning of MacAdam’s difference ellipses, see discussion later in this
section.
10MacAdam’s assessment turned out to be correct. Already, Silberstein (1938, 1943) had
demonstrated that the basic assumptions of psychophysics imply that a surface of constant
brightness will have variable curvature, a result confirmed by the experiments just discussed.
This curved two dimensional surface can be approximated in Euclidean three space, however,
leaving open the possibility that a Euclidean color solid might approximate perceptual dis-
tances. The Optical Society of America established a committee in 1947 to investigate the
possibility of defining a color solid which would be perceptually isotropic, i.e. equal distances
in any direction would represent equal degrees of perceptual difference. Eventually, the com-
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mittee experimentally determined that the color solid is locally Riemannian. This is due to
an effect dubbed by Judd (1970) the “hue super-importance” effect. Because we are more
sensitive to changes in hue than in degree of chromaticity (“colorfulness”), any color space
in which hue and chroma are represented by units of equal size must have a circumference
approximately twice 360◦. Judd himself used the image of a crinkled fan to try and describe
this effect. Although the committee eventually “forced the data into an euclidean form”
(MacAdam, 1985, p. 167) in order to produce the OSA Uniform Color Scales, strictly speak-
ing no close approximation of perceptually equal color distances in three Euclidean dimensions
is possible (Kuehni and Schwarz, 2008, p. 165–167).
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